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 Introducton 
 
By the beginning of the nineties of the last century it became clear for many people 
in Europe and North America t hat the time has come to balance relations between two 
sides of the Atlantic in a new fashion and for the European NATO member-countries the 
time has come to undertake some measures to increase their responsibility for the 
common security and defence. European countries embarked a process designed to 
strengthen and develop a european “basis” of NATO-European Security and Defence 
Identity [ESDI}, as well as to provide a genuine military capability without duplicating 
the command structures, planning staffs a nd military assets and capabilities already 
available within NATO while simultaneously increasing their contribution to the 
Alliance’s missions and activities. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the 
European aspirations to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and also to 
promote the creation of more stable and balanced transatlantic relations, consolidating the 
North Atlantic union as a whole. 
But the development of the relations in the world and especially in NATO was 
characterized not so smoothly as was supposed. 
The study of processes, connected with NATO’s role in the transformation of the 
European security environment assumes an important significance now when the world 
saw large strategically important changes, touched upon all the european and euroasiatic 
area. Events, taking place since the nineties of last century give rise to new decisions, 
realization of which would essentially change the Alliance’s structure and its military 
establishment. 
To-day in the conditions of a new security situation, when the massive threat from 
the East gone and EU is aspiring to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
security problems should be solved in a new fashion. In this connection an important step 
towards closer cooperation between the U SA and their European allies was taken during the January, 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. At this Summit the 16 member-countries 
of the Alliance officially approved the Program of formation and development within 
NATO European Security and Defence Identity  [ESDI], directed at the strengthening of 
the European ‘pillar’ of NATO, while reinforcing the Atlantic links. The ESDI would 
enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security defence. 
They expressed their support for strengthening this European pillar of the Alliance 
through the Western European Union (WEU), which has began to develop as the defence 
component of the European Union(EU).In order to avoid duplication of capabilities 
NATO has agreed to make its collective assets and capabilities available for WEU 
operations, undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Creation of ESDI within NATO was considered an integral part of the 
internal adaptation of this organization’s political  and military structures, which would 
permit the European Allies to provide a genuine and effective military capability to the 
Alliance’s missions and operations as a manifestation of transatlantic solidarity. 
 
In this connection we decided to begin our research with studying NATO Summit 
documents and resolutions as well as materials published in the press and on this basis to 
determine what the ESDI is and its role in NATO as well as its influence on the 
transatlantic links. Besides we tried to consider the problems of creating autonomous 
military structure of the European Union and their coordination with ESDI and the 
problems of development of NATO’s second european pillar (either parallel development 
of both structures or their merging and developing into a unified structure of ES). In 
connection with the last events  – terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 
2001, war in Afghanistan and Iraq  – we also tried to see their influence on NATO and the 
relations between the USA and their european  allies as well as their transatlantic 
cooperation. And it became clear that NATO is turned out to be in a very interesting 
situation. Events of September, the 11 stroke a terrible blow on the United States but more terrible in a political sense they stroke on NATO. It turned out that the Alliance is 
practically useless from the point of view of repulsing new threats. Besides the NATO is 
turned out to be put aside in the second time in these five years during the most serious 
crises (Afghanistan and Iraq). M oreover the creation of the EU own military capability 
can be compared with a delayed-action bomb, which was put under the future of the 
Alliance. 
 
§ 1  
During the existence and development of the Alliance the balance of the American 
and Westeuropean influence has been permanently changing. Its displacement either to 
one side or another depends first of all on correlation of efforts between the United States 
and their Westeuropean partners in different spheres of NATO activity. 
Neither by the creation of the Alliance nor during long-time period after its formation 
there were no doubts about legitimacy and expediency of the US leading position in it. It 
was considered that without the USA Western Europe would not be able to defend itself. 
But in the long run  the situation has been changed. The changing correlation of forces on 
the international scene revealed deep geostrategical differences between the USA and 
their Westeuropean NATO allies bringing about new moments in their relations. 
The most bright expression of this became a line on the formation of “the European 
core” in NATO. This line was contrasted with two opposite “scenarios” of the 
development of american-Westeuropean relations. One of them envisaged maximum 
drawing of the USA into the defence of Europe, represented as the only possible 
guarantee of Westeuropean security for the sake of which Westeuropeans should go 
against their own interests if they run counter to the american ones. 
In accordance with the second scenario Western Europe should free  itself from the 
military-political cover of the United States or even completely reject it and substitute the 
North Atlantic Alliance for exclusively Westeuropean military-political alliance. In West Europe both these “scenarios” finds definite support and at the same time 
they are vulnerable from the critics. It is becoming clear after all that both recommended 
lines of behaviour are too radical. The first one ignores the increased economical, 
political and military capabilities of the Western NATO countries and makes quite 
irrelevant the question of returning Alliance to the times when the US right to dictate 
their will to their allies was not practically contested. Another line underestimates the role 
which the USA is playing in military-political activity of NATO and which could be 
extremely difficult for the Westeuropean partners to undertake in full scope. 
The attractiveness of the idea of formation and enhancement of the “European core” 
in NATO is explained by the fact that it is deprived of the extremes of both atlantism and 
europeism. The talk is not about either NATO’s transformation into a branch of the 
American Defence Ministry or the liquidation of this block. It is proposed to strengthen 
NATO in every possible way and more actively develop contacts between its 
westeuropean partners by increasing their role in the formulating and realizing NATO’s 
politics. That is the accent is made on the “europeization” of NATO who is supposed to 
make through the creation within the Alliance westeuropean own mechanisms as well as 
through their activities. On a parity basis with it some other institutions out of NATO 
such as WEU and EU should act. This line is presumed to be prevailing now in the 
westeuropean military-political development. 
From the opposite side o f the Atlantic ocean the main meaning of NATO’s 
europeazation is seen to mobilize the US westeuropean allies for more active military 
preparations within the Alliance and to intensify their orientation for atlantic links and to 
prevent the appearance of “Neutrality syndrom” in westeuropean policy. In this 
connection they exercise steady pressure on West Europe so that it improves its 
contribution into NATO’s war preparations. The USA would like to turn the block’s 
europeazation only to that. 
 § 2  
 
The development of the westeuropean military-political integration up to the end of 
the eighties progressed mostly towards the enhancement of the “NATO eurogroup” 
because a number of the European Union countries not wishing to reduce its national 
sovereignty limited artificially the Western European Union’s authority in the sphere of 
Security. 
However in the early nineties in connection with the change of geopolitical situation 
in Europe the NATO european member-countries embarked upon a process designed to 
increase their contribution to the fulfilment of the Alliance’s missions and activities and 
to enable them to assume greater responsibility for the common security and defence as a 
manifestation of transatlantic solidarity. This was done with a view to provide a genuine 
European military capability without duplicating the command structures, planning staffs 
and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO. Such an approach 
was seen as responding both to the european wish to develop a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and to the need for a balanced partnership between the North American 
and European member-countries of the Alliance. 
  By 90-ties the relations between WEU, EU and NATO have changed. And 
everywhere it was underlined that it was WEU’s  vocation to be simultaneously “defence 
identity” for EU and “European pillar” for NATO. For the first time these aims were 
announced at the Maastricht Summit in 1999 and at the Ministerial meeting of WEU in 
Petersberg in 1992 and developed in Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. 
  The essence of the Treaty on European Union, which was signed in Maastricht 
was that the European Communities were supplemented by a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence. In this connection the Summit in Maastricht 
also adopted a Special declaration on WEU, which was thought as a main real structure for EU could lean on in this sphere. Thus the Maastricht declaration called upon the 
WEU to develop itself as a “defence component” of EU and as a means of strengthening 
the European pillar of the Alliance, that is to serve as a bridge military organization 
between the USA and Europe. 
  For the first time the term “European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was 
used in the Maastricht declaration. According to it the European Identity should exist in 
three dimensions: 
1)  The North Atlantic Alliance, adapted to create opportunities for the europeans to 
assume greater responsibility in the defence matters; 
2)  Intensified Common Foreign and Security Policy able to determine and defend 
European interests and actively react to event; 
3)  Strong WEU, capable to secure politically and practically political control and 
strategic direction of the WEU-led operations of Petersberg type, undertaken by the 
european allies. 
The activity, directed at the preparation and realization of the ESDI has been 
conducted within these organizations. 
In the Alliance the policy directed at the formation within HATO the European 
Security and Defence Identity was officially approved in 1994. It was directed at 
strengthening the European pillar of NATO while reinforcing the transatlantic links, that 
would enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and 
defence and to make more essential and effective contribution into operations and 
activities of the Alliance as an expression of their common responsibilities. 
Simultaneously it would also strengthen the transatlantic partnership. 
So the European allies began the process aimed at strengthening their contribution to 
the Alliance’s missions and activities called to create opportunities to increase their 
resposibility for common security and defence as a manifestation of transatlantic 
solidarity. This w as done with a view to providing a genuine European military capability without duplicating the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and 
capabilities already available within NATO. Such an approach was seen as responding 
both to the European wish to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and to the 
need for a balanced partnership between the North American and European member-
countries of the Alliance. 
In the political sphere the formation and development of the European Security and 
Defence Identity was aimed at strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance while 
reinforcing the transatlantic links. It was supposed to create capabilities for the European 
allies to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence and to 
enable a more coherent contribution to be made by the European allies to the security of 
the Alliance as a whole. 
In the military sphere the development of the ESDI calls for assets of the Alliance 
together with the forces of non-NATO countries i n agreed circumstances to be placed 
under the authority of the Western European Union for operations in which the Alliance 
itself may not be directly involved. 
In this connection one of the main requirements of the ESDI is accordingly for 
arrangements, which enable the necessary elements of the NATO command structure to 
be used to assist in the conduct of operations led by the Western European Union. These 
elements have therefore been described as “separable, but not separate”, since they can be 
placed under the authority of the Western European Union while remaining integral parts 
of the Alliance’s own military structure. 
 
§ 3  
Another important aspect in the development of the European Security and Defence 
Identity is the concept known as “Combined Joint Task Forces” or “CJTF”. 
What it is CJTF? A CJTF is a multinational {combined} and multi-service {joint) 
temporary task force, organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military missions and requiring multinational and multi-service command a nd control by a CJTF 
headquarters. It may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. 
The CJTF concept was put forward at the end of 1993 and approved at the Summit 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels in January, 1994. 
At  this Summit Heads of State and Government endorsed the concept as an important 
part of the adaptation of the Alliance structures to changes in the European security 
environment. 
This concept is designed to provide NATO with a flexible means to respond to n ew 
security challenges, including operations involving the participation of nations outside 
the Alliance. It is aimed at improving NATO’s ability to deploy at short notice 
appropriate multinational and multi-services forces matched to the specific requirements 
of a particular military operation. It will also facilitate the integration of non-NATO 
participation in NATO-led operations. Many features of the CJTF concept have already 
been put into practice in the context of the NATO-led peace-keeping operations in the 
Balkan region. 
  So they endorsed the formation of the ESDI. Besides they connected the CJTF 
concept with practical military-political cooperation within the “Partnership for Peace” 
Programme.  
  The need which it was created to fulfil arose from the changing security situation 
in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to peace and 
stability. It was also stipulated by internal adaptation of NATO, reduction of its forces as 
well as in connection with the adaptive Treaty about the Armed Forces in Europe the 
most of NATO forces in peace time was turned over to full subordination of National 
command of their countries. As a result NATO does not have now a standing army its 
own but the majority of the so-called “NATO forces” are national forces which remain 
under national control and would only become available to the Alliance and be placed 
under the responsibility of NATO military commanders in specific circumstances in accordance with the procedures agreed by member countries in advance. The Alliance 
now has only headquarters and command structures of different level, the role of which 
consist in ensuring joint military planning, in development of common standards for 
training and strategy required to enable national forces  to carry out new tasks ranging 
from collective defence to peace-keeping and help them in conducting organizational 
measures necessary to their common education and training, command and control. It is 
precisely in this connection it was agreed that future  security arrangements would call for 
easily deployable, multinational, multi-service military formations tailored to specific 
kinds of military tasks. These included humanitarian relief, peace-keeping and peace 
enforcement as well as collective defence. The forces required would vary according to 
the circumstances and would need to be generated rapidly and at short notice. 
  As an example of such forces there are Implementation Force, Stabilization Force 
as well as Kosovo Force. 
  At the core of the CJTF concept which was evolved to meet this needs are the 
command and control arrangements essential to allow such forces to operate effectively. 
The wide variety of circumstances under which CJTF might operate places considerable 
demands on the command and control arrangements for such operations. The role of 
CJTF headquarters is therefore crucial. A CJTF headquarters will be formed around core 
elements {the nuclei} from selected “parent” headquarters of the NATO command 
structures. It will be augmented from other  NATO headquarters and by nations and 
contributing Partner countries as necessary using modular approach in order to meet the 
requirements of the specific .missions.  
  Consequently no separate structures are required for the CJTFs arrangements for 
assignment of forces to CJTFs by member nations follow normal NATO force planning 
procedures. Nevertheless the flexibility which is built into CJTF concept places 
considerable demands on arrangements for commanding and controlling the task forces 
that is to say on  CJTF headquarters. In this connection as it was said above core elements of a small number of CJTF headquarters are therefore being established within selected 
“parent” headquarters of NATO’s command structure. CJTF headquarters rely primarily 
on “dual-hatted” personnel  – i. e. personnel undertaking other responsibilities when not 
operating in a CJTF context. 
  The minimum baseline for the Alliance planning was the principle that at least 
two CJTF headquarters had to be able to undertake large-scale operations. This capability 
should be complemented by the ability to form a number of smaller-scale land-based and 
sea-based CJTF headquarters. These must be able to command land forces of brigade or 
division size with comparably sized naval and air force components. The proposed 
structures had to be able to meet CJTF Hq “nuclei” requirements and to provide the 
requisite ability to generate CJTF Hq staff for both NATO and WEU-led operations. 
  A number of trials of the CJTF concept have been completed, for example,  in the 
context of the Exercise Allied Effort in November, 1997, in which a number of Partner 
countries participated as observers; and in the context of the Exercise Strong Resolve in 
March, 1998 in which  Partner countries participated and were integrated  throughout the 
structure of the CJTF. The aim of the trials was to validate the evolving CJTF 
headquarters concept. 
  Based on these trials and other relevant staff analyses the Alliance began the full 
implementation of the CJTF concept in 1999. This process which includes the acquisition 
of necessary headquarters support and command, control and communications equipment 
is scheduled for completion in the late 2004. 
  So the CJTF concept is designed to provide NATO with flexible means to 
respond to new security challenges. It is aimed at improving NATO’s ability to deploy at 
short notice appropriate multinational and multi-services formations matched to the 
specific demands of a particular military operation. This concept will also ensure the 
integration of Non-NATO participation in NATO-led operations. Undoubtedly that 
NATO will get as a result an important instrument for crisis management in 21st century.   ESDI strengthening would depend not so on the Institutional changes but on the 
forces modernization in accordance with the challenges of the new security environment. 
 
§ 4  
  ESDI would be simply empty words if it is not connected with the enhancement 
of capabilities 
  The most significant role in this is called to play a “Defence Capabilities 
Initiative” (DCI),which became one of the most important results of NATO’s Summit 
meeting in Washington in April, 1999. The aim of this initiative is to ensure effective 
operations with the consideration of new roles and possible future missions  – from 
reaction on the humanitarian catastrophes up to the peace enforcement operations and 
operations of high intensity while defending the territory of the Alliance. 
  As the NATO General Secretary Lord Robertson stated, “Defence Capabilities 
Initiative” is directed not only to preservation of interoperability of forces and assets of 
all NATO allies but also to improvement and modernization of their capabilities to resist 
new security challenges”. 
  DCI is specifically oriented on those areas where NATO should develop its 
operational potential to meet effectively the security challenges of the nearest years and 
decades. DCI is aimed in particular to improve the interoperability of military forces of 
member-countries. In addition the task was set to improve Alliance’s military capabilities 
in the following areas, which are partially coincided with one another: 
-  “mobility and deployability”, i. e. the ability to deploy forces quickly to where 
they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory; 
-  “sustainability”, i. e. the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home 
bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations; 
-  “effective engagement”, i. e. the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all 
types of operations from high to low intensity; -  “survivability”, i. e. the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current 
and future threats; 
-  “interoperable communications”, i. e. command, control and information systems 
which are compatible with each other t o enable forces from different countries to work 
effectively together. 
DCI is not only basis for the improvement of the capabilities of the European 
member-countries and reinforcement of NATO’s “European pillar”, but for steady 
military and political viability of the Alliance. 
  Current gap in technology and capabilities between the USA and their European 
allies manifested especially during the war in Yugoslavia entails some consequences: 
-  Very soon the armed forces of the European countries could not cooperate with 
the americans because of their “technological backwardness”. The US achievements in 
intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, command, control and communications, 
precision-guided weapons begin fully supercede the allies on these spheres. 
-  Would lead to new tensions in the Alliance if the European armies would find 
themselves in a situation when they had to carry out dangerous missions demanding great 
human resources and possibly connected with considerable losses while the United States 
will provide high technological logistics, strategic air and sea lift, intelligence and air 
power. 
-  Might bring about the problems of finance burden distribution and intensification 
of mutual sense of injury in connection with the Europe’s growing dependence upon the 
United States. 
-  Might at the end bring the political and military significance of NATO down to a 
minimum because the possibility of reciprocal measures on the part of the US-European 
coalition to serious threats for the European and american interests is becoming less real. The continuation of political and military support of the Alliance on the part of the 
USA would depend on the ability of their European allies to make their worthy 
contribution to the joint operations. 
  The talk is not going about NATO replacement but about the fact that the most 
important for the Alliance’s viability in future will be sharp reinforcement of the 
European military capabilities. 
 
  About the significance of military capabilities for ESDI to succeed NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robertson spoke at London conference “The Globalization of 
Defence Industry: Policy Implications for NATO and ESDI» in January, 2001. He 
specifically said: «To-day, Europe simply does not have the capabilities it needs to be a 
truly effective security actor both for NATO or EU operations. There must be no illusions 
on this matter... As we enter the 21 st Century, the Euro-Atlantic community  - North 
America and Europe together  - has to face some tough challenges when it comes to 
improving our capability. We need to address the capability gap, and ensure our forces 
can work together. And we have to get the best equipment our tight defence budgets 
allow. All of this is necessary, if we are to ensure that Europe has the capabilities 
necessary to meet its aspirations, and be a stronger partner to North America in security, 
but also if we want to make sure that NATO countries to be able to carry out its missions 
effectively in the future». 
In another speech in Munich in February, 2002 he said: «Yet the United States must 
do much more in facilitating the process of European defence modernization. By easing 
unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial cooperation. Washington 
can improve the quality of capabilities available and diminish any problems our forces 
have in working together». 
The Revolution in Military Affairs in the USA, as was pointed out before, will 
deepen the gap in the equipment of the american and european forces that is why the 
European defence systems should be technologically raised up to the level which would 
permit them to join the american ones. Otherwise the matters will turn so that US-
european cooperation will convert into empty phrase, political slogan. 
The Defence Capabilities Initiative, which indicated at the necessity of improving 
about 58 different military-technological projects is carried out poorly. For the past period, judging by the assertions of the official persons, this programme was only half 
fulfilled. In this connection despite the NATO authorities statements that the 
development of ESDI and DCA would promote the transatlantic links, in reality it could 
be quite opposite. European reluctunce to make valuable financial contribution to the 
collective security gives rise to doubts among Americans  in regard to the reliability of the 
European identity within NATO. This doubt was increased after the wars in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, where the lack of equality between the US army and armies of other NATO 
member-countries was discovered quite obviously. 
 
§ 5  
  The formation of the European Security and Defence Identity became not only an 
integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures, but also an 
important element of the development of both the European Union (EU) and Western 
European Union (WEU). Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis 
of the European Union’s Treaties of Maastricht in 1991 and Amsterdam in 1997 and the 
corresponding declarations of the Western European Union and decisions taken by the 
Alliance at successive Summit meetings held in Brussels in 1994, Madrid in 1997 and 
Washington in 1999 as well as at NATO’s ministerial sessions. 
  The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1991) reflects the agreement of the 
leaders of the European Communities on the development of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) which was able to determine and defend European interests and 
react promptly to the events. This agreement included the reference to the Western 
European Union as an integral part of the d evelopment of the European Union as well as 
the request to the WEU itself to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the 
European Union which have defence implications. 
  At the meeting of the WEU which took place in Maastricht (December, 1991) 
concurrently with the meeting of the European Council WEU member-states issued a declaration about the agreement on the need for a genuine European Security and 
Defence Identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters. 
In January, 1994 NATO H eads of State and Government welcomed the entry into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and allowing the European members of 
NATO to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all NATO’s allies. They 
again reaffirmed that the Alliance was the essential forum for consultations among its 
members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence 
commitments of the allies under  the Washington Treaty. They also welcomed the close 
and growing cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), 
achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. They 
further announced that they stood ready to m ake collective assets of the Alliance 
available on the basis of consultation in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations 
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
At the Summit meeting in Madrid in July, 1997 NATO Heads of State and 
Government welcomed the major steps taken with regard to the creation of ESDI within 
the Alliance. 
As a result of the decisions to develop ESDI within NATO, arrangements have been 
defined as part of the adaptation of the Alliance to cover all aspects of NATO support for 
WEU-led operations. These include: 
-  Taking WEU requirements into account in NATO’s new defence planning 
procedures for developing forces and capabilities. (The WEU began contributing to the 
Alliance defence planning process in 1997); 
-  Introducing procedures for identifying NATO’s assets and capabilities on which 
the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council; -  Establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, 
which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct operation under the 
political control and strategic direction of the WEU. Under these arrangements the 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (Deputy SACEUR) acquires a distinct role both in 
normal times and in the context of WEU-led operations in relation to the forces to be 
made available to the WEU 
-  Introducing consultation and information-sharing arrangement to provide the 
coordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support. 
-  Developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions. 
In practice these arrangements would mean that if a crisis arose in which the WEU 
decided to intervene and the Alliance choose not to it could request the use of Alliance 
assets and capabilities possibly including a CJTF headquarters for conducting an 
operation under its own political control and strategic direction. 
In this case the assets requested could be made available for the WEU’s use by the 
North Atlantic Council on a case-by case basis. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU 
as well as for monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall would be 
registered in a specific agreement between the two organizations. During the operation 
NATO would monitor the use of its assets and maintain regular political liaison with the 
WEU. European commanders from the NATO command structure would be nominated 
to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of 
the operation or when required. Throughout the operation including its preparatory phase 
NATO and WEU could consult closely. 
The next steps in the further development of ESDI within the Alliance include further 
work to complete or refine agreements on the use of NATO assets and command 
arrangements and on information-sharing and joint testing and evaluation of crisis 
management procedures followed by exercising of command elements and forces. These 
measures would help to develop the concrete procedures needed to support WEU operations a nd to ensure that they are well rehearsed in case they have to be put into 
action. CJTF concept was adopted. According to this concept NATO could provide 
“separable but not separate” military capabilities for the operations undertaken by the 
European allies without the USA. It is also aimed at providing improved operational 
flexibility and permitting the more extensive and mobile deployment of forces needed to 
respond to the new demands of all alliance missions. It was foreseen the wider 
employment of multinational formations organized by the European members of the 
Alliance. 
The important turning point which made the European governments to remember 
their decision to elaborate common European defence policy and to form common armed 
forces was a war in Kosovo. During this war it became evident that the United States 
have more effective means of intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, more 
effective precision-guided weapons as well as the advantage in such spheres as strategic 
air and sea lift, logistics and communications. The war showed the gap between the 
military capabilities of the allies. It also demonstrated that the Europeans could not be 
able to support their initiatives in economy and diplomacy by adequate military means. 
For most of the EU-member states  – especially France and Great Britain  – the subject of 
serious concern also became complex and ineffective processes of decision-making in the 
EU/WEU and NATO on the problems of crisis management in Europe by military means. 
Thus the Kosovo  crisis made much more contribution to the development of the 
European Defence Identity than the whole decade of postMaastricht considerations on the 
Common Foreign and Defence Policy. 
Kosovo revealed such unpleasant fact for Europe  – it depends on the military might 
of the USA. Together it underlined also another fact that the Americans do not want to 
risk the life of their soldiers in tangible european conflicts that do not represent a real 
threat to the US national interests. The lesson for the europeans  is evident: the US would 
stay an important factor of preserving peace and security on the continent until Europe would not show its willingness to take greater responsibility for ensuring their own 
defence. As a result this main lesson of Kosovo pushed EU to revise its attitude to the 
European cooperation in the field of defence, but not to weaken NATO and with the aim 
of creation of EU’s military structures capable to strengthen diplomatic means. 
As the Italian Foreign Minister said in an interview for the “Panorama” Magazine in 
April, 1999: ”Europe should elaborate its own vision of security. But together with deep 
appreciation to the USA for their deeds, Europe should realize that it is weak because it 
does not have its own autonomous defence policy. The  European Union should be a 
supplement but not the alternative to NATO. But we could not allow ourselves to further 
depend on the USA”. 
 
§ 6  
But true break-through in the sphere of security took place at the end of 1999 when 
the EU decided to make its own  unified defence system. But for this the WEU should be 
integrated into the EU structures and the European Union itself gets its own army. 
The EU Summit in Helsinki (December, 1999) gave a new turn to the development 
of ESDI which marked  a new stage in evolution of agreements about European security 
and defence, that is: 
-  the EU intention to absorb WEU in near future; 
-  to deploy by 2003 military force of up to 60000 troops; 
-  to create permanent political and military structures, including a Political and 
Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. 
All this points out to again found by the Union determination to become a serious 
and independent member of process of ensuring Security. 
The outcome of the EU Council in Helsinki shows that t he EU not only goes further 
the former statements on the ESDI’s problems but vitally gets out of the model of the 
transatlantic partnership, agreed by Alliance’s Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1996, the aim of which was the development of “separable but not separate” European Security and 
Defence Identity within NATO. 
At the same time it was underlined that the Western European Union should be a 
little bridge between the EU and NATO, emphasizing the independent character of 
relations between these organizations. 
Should the WEU be absorbed by the European Union this understanding would be 
invalid because the EU would take the WEU’s functions. 
The main landmarks in the creation of the Common European Foreign and Security 
Policy were EU Summits in da Feira (Portugal, June, 2000), Nice (December, 2000) and 
Geteborg (June, 2001). These Summits adopted important documents for the framing of 
mentioned political course. These documents contained the directives for the main 
conceptual political and structural changes  which should be carried out to create an 
effective security and defence system of the EU. It was also emphasized that new systems 
in no way to be a competitor or alternative to NATO but on the contrary it was said about 
inevitable arrangements of close contacts, coordination of actions and deepening of 
cooperation between NATO and EU. 
The mechanism of implementation of a common foreign policy is sufficiently 
complex, but at the same time flexible as it permits  EU member-countries to keep some 
independence.  It might be supposed that an intergovernmental process of coordination 
and decision of the problems of Foreign policy of security and defence will remain for a 
long period. The EU member-countries now say that it is not possible to admit that they 
are ready to move from the “common” foreign policy to “unified” foreign policy. It has 
been remaining different approaches both to separate countries and regions and to certain 
political problems. It has been planned further enlargement of the EU and naturally it 
would insert its corrections into the formation of CESDP and its mechanisms. Where this 
process will come to would depend first of all on the fact what identity the EU will select 
for itself and it might be realized that the coordination within the framework of 15 States is one process but in the framework say of 20-25 or 27 States is a new qualitative level of 
complexity. But this process has been started and is developing. 
Strategically the main part in taking decisions about conducting operations of one  or 
the other types should belong to the EU Council of Ministers. There were created as we 
have already mentioned new political and military structures: a Political and Security 
Committee, consisting of the representatives of member-countries which is called to 
follow for the development of international situation and to promote the elaboration of 
the EU unified foreign policy; a Military Committee which includes on a permanent basis 
representatives of the Chiefs of Staff gives recommendations to the Political and Security 
Committee; a Military Staff, receiving instructions from the Military Committee is 
engaged in implementation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy 
(evaluation of the situation, strategic planning and so on) 
The period of framing  Common European Security and Defence Policy was 
completed in Nice by the creation of permanent structures and by adoption of the 
commitments to ensure capabilities and decisions concerning NATO and third countries. 
The Political and Security Committee who  consists of the ambassadors would play an 
important role in the formation of the EU policy in case of crisis and in the control for its 
consistent realization. In crisis situation a High Representative of EU would be the 
Chairman of the Committee. The Committee would exercise political control and 
strategic direction of the operation. It would be assisted by the Military Committee, 
consisting of the military representatives of the fifteen EU member-states. This 
Committee would give recommendations on military matters and realize the effective 
military management of the Military Staff. 
The EU Military Staff consisting of a hundred members would be engaged in 
observation and analysis as well as operational planning. The European Union also outlined collective  aims in forming capabilities in three 
strategic directions: strategic mobility, headquarters and command arrangements for 
combined forces and means of collective information for these purposes. 
On November 21, 2000 a Capabilities Commitment Conference of D efence Ministers 
of the European Union took place. At this conference every minister pledged substantial 
contribution of his state to the formation of capabilities. This conference became the first 
concrete realization of EU’s determination to create common military capabilities. 
Talk is about the fact that by 2003 EU will have the capability to conduct 
peacekeeping and other operations on the european or the nearest to Europe theater of 
operations deploying within 60 days and sustaining for at least one year military forces of 
up to 60000 troops with their own system of command and control, intelligence and 
logistics as well as with air and naval support. 
The ministers also came to a conclusion that the proposed now by the EU member-
countries resources of 1 00000 troops, 400 combat planes and 100 warships would ensure 
the needs of new European forces. 
  The most considerable contribution to the Eurocorps of 13500 troops was 
promised by Germany, then goes France (12000 troops) and Great Britain of 12500. Italy 
and Spain committed themselves to offer 6000 troops each; Netherlands – 5000; Greece – 
3000; Finland and Sweden  – 2000 each; Belgium, Portugal and Ireland  – 1000 troops 
each and Luxemburg – 500. 
  The fifteen EU member-states agreed methods of cooperation w ith NATO in 
order to have possibilities to use its assets and capabilities according to the commitments 
adopted by the Alliance in Washington. These procedures were approved by NATO at 
the end of 2000. There were foreseen some commitments which could be undertaken by 
the States which are not members of the EU in order they could take part with the WEU-
led crisis management operations.   It was envisaged the creation of the Committee of the Contributing Countries 
which would unite during the operation member-countries that is countries of “fifteen” 
with the third states and which would provide these states with the possibility to play an 
important role in the crisis management. 
  The following features in our opinion pushed the European Union to the 
formation of its own security system: 
-  US pressure on the allies more like as twisting hands with the aim to make them 
to contribute more to the strengthening of NATO; 
-  US open disregard the interests of their allies including the security matters. For 
example, unleashing the war in Yugoslavia the americans has been striving to move into 
Balkans in order to show once more their strength and might and mainly to tie their allies 
into the bloodshed; 
-  Material considerations such as the unification of defence capabilities of the EU 
member-countries that would permit them to allot suitable means for the procurement of 
modern armaments and military techniques; 
-  The ability fond by the Westeuropean countries to proceed first of all from their 
own interests in economic, trade, currency, scientific, technical and even foreign policy 
matters has become a symbol of independence and affirmation and permit them to go out 
of subordinate position in the military-political sphere. 
The question of forming EU own defence structures w ent to the level of practical 
solution immediately roused serious differences in NATO. 
  First of all the USA has expressed their displeasure with the aspirations of the 
Europeans to have more independence in defence matters and striving to have a right of 
“veto” on every decision of the command of the rapid respond forces. They are also 
insisting that the European rapid response forces should be subordinate to the Alliance. 
France does not agree to this and has taken a firm position putting out an idea of 
autonomous system for strategic planning of the created force. Great Britain is altercating with France and under the pressure of the USA is showing inconsistency in the question 
of forming European armed forces. It departed from some principal agreements.  The 
Defence minister of Great Britain G. Chun said that until schemes of cooperation 
between the EU and NATO would not be worked out in detail there is no reason to form 
European forces of rapid response. 
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Discussions on this problem were added by impetus in the form of the “Joint 
Declaration on the European Defence” Joint Communique on the results of two-way 
Anglo-French summit in St.Malo at December, 1998. The official circles as well as 
means of mass information proclaimed St.Malo as a true “turning-point” in the EU 
approach to the Security. 
At the first time European plans in defence sphere came out of the institutional 
arrangements and were filled with real military content. In St. Malo France’s position 
was adopted according to which “The Union should have the capability to carry out 
autonomous operations in defence sphere; as far as Great Britain is concerned it strived to 
underline the organic link between EU and NATO. Both countries said, that “The Union 
should have necessary command, control and information systems, reconnaissance and 
surveillance systems and the capability for appropriate strategic planning without 
unnecessary duplication of all that is available within NATO”. Tony Blair’s government 
agreed with France’s opinion as to the fact  that the strengthening of European defence 
capability would not only harm the transatlantic links but quite opposite would be 
necessary element which would preserve the NATO’s important role and The US 
participation in European Security System. Crossing this European Rubicon in defence 
sphere Great Britain opened a new chapter in the European integration and set up 
premises for the beginning of a new dialogue between Brussels and Washington on 
defence and security matters. All this was made on the understanding that The European Security and Defence 
Policy does not foresee the weakening of links with the North Atlantic Alliance as NATO 
remains a basis for the transatlantic security and proceed from the fundamental reality: 
the Europeans have numerous common  economic and social interests. They share 
aspirations to the union of stable democracies in a stable environment. Devotion to this is 
a basis for European construction. It also stimulates the creation of the European defence 
by EU member-countries. But all this could have results only if it relies on the effective 
bodies and serious military capabilities on  the creation of which the European Union 
concentrates its effort now. 
Plans for the formation European armed forces are very modest and only give the E U 
opportunity to conduct military operations where the USA choose not to. Yet during 
many years ahead EU military operations would depend on NATO command structures 
and US assets in such spheres as intelligence and logistics. 
It is difficult to imagine that the EU could independently begin any serious military 
operation without the US approval. But it is this remaining uncertainty and unclearity of 
operational aspects of military structure and the EU future operations evoke anxiety on 
the other side of the  Atlantic. Trying to satisfy the Americans the EU is considering the 
problem to propose to the key NATO military representatives status of permanent 
representatives or observes in the EU Political and Security Committee and Military 
Committee. One more EU i nitiative is to propose the Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe to take part if necessary in the EU Military Committee activity. 
Nevertheless 11 out of 15 EU member-states have plans to send to the Military 
Committees of NATO and EU the same representatives and this would ensure 
transparence and smooth enough cooperation. 
The United States expressing earlier anxiety in regards to the European defence 
identity now have moved a number of conditions concerning in particular close 
coordination of EU actions with NATO while keeping supreme role of the latter in ensuring security as well as including into European planning six European members of 
NATO not being EU members (these provisions were then included into the EU 
documents on CESDP). But it is evident t hat fulfilling the project and meeting new 
security threats are only possible within euroatlantic partnership, close cooperation with 
the USA and NATO as a whole. Positive evaluation of the process started by the 
European Union is contained in the Common S tatement of the USA and EU at the 
Summit in Geteborg where it was stated that this project would strengthen the EU and the 
“European pillar” of NATO. 
During last time the European Security and Defence Policy has made an impressive 
way forward on the provision the European Union with necessary structures and assets to 
react in crisis situations. 
Talk is not about the formation of the European Army but about the forces 
contributed by some countries on a national basis, components of which could be used 
for crisis management outside the EU area with the agreement of appropriate capitals and 
the UNO mandate. Providing the EU with the capability to manage fast crisis situations 
and with appropriate command structures together with the policy of defending all 15 E U 
members does not run counter either to the policy of the non-alignment, conducted by 
some countries or to NATO’s role. So the EU member-countries again confirmed that the 
North Atlantic Alliance has been the basis for the collective defence of its members 
which has exclusive advantage  – it has all military and civilian crisis-management 
capabilities to regulate international disputes: from diplomatic control during precrisis 
situation up to the financial, administrative and tactical abilities to conduct r estoration 
works after the finish of war stage. 
The European Union always declared its readiness to conduct consultations with 
other countries about the problems of military crisis management. 
The need of strengthening European role in NATO was underlined  by its Secretary 
General G. Robertson who characterized it as a question of absolute necessity. If NATO would like to be as strong organization in the future as it was in the past it should develop 
good, effective and reliable links with the European Union as the role of the latter is 
rising in this sphere. Noting that “strengthening of Europe’s role in NATO does not mean 
the reduction of the North America’s role”, Lord Robertson underlined the fact that 
transatlantic relations remain key to support the effectiveness of NATO and that a real 
stability in Europe and protection of its democratic values is not possible without stable 
transatlantic links. 
In 2001 practical realization and consolidation of agreements assume within the EU 
appreciable character. Impulse to this process was given by September, 11 tragic events 
in Washington and New-York and subsequent alteration of world situation. 
As far as the North Atlantic union is concerned the period after September, 11 was 
very complicated from the point of view of transatlantic relations. After the terrorist 
attack on New-York and Washington NATO for the first time triggered Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, but not for ensuring security of the European allies as it was 
supposed but for the defence of the United States. However the USA began to form 
antiterrorist coalition not on the principles of Atlantic solidarity but on a pragmatic basis. 
(It includes Great Britain, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kirghizstan and Pakistan). A 
cold shower for European allies became the statement of US deputy defence minister P. 
Woolfowitz, which was made during his visit to NATO headquarters in October, 2001. In 
this statement he thanked the allies for a proposed help but underlined that in the matter 
of ensuring its own security his country could not rely on the “coalition of states which 
are always ready to act” By this he had in mind the experience of Kosovo crisis when the 
so-called “war of committees” in NATO seriously complicated the adoption of decisions. 
Since then N ATO General Secretary Lord Robertson has began to talk about the 
necessity of NATO’s transformation and first of all in the decision-making process. 
One more challenge for NATO connected with changed world situation, with the 
state of transatlantic relations, enlargement and new quality relations with Russia was a development of a new strategy. Addressing the meeting of NATO Defence ministers in 
Warsaw at the end of September, 2001 Lord Robertson spoke about the necessity of 
working out the preemptive strategy against some outcast countries as the United States 
called them. But apparently this idea might be only a part of anew strategy which would 
replace the one adopted in Washington in April, 1999. And the basis of this strategy 
would be apparently formed  by a concept preemptive strike, adopted from the US 
Foreign policy doctrine according to which Washington could strike first on countries, 
which in its opinion have some relations to world terrorism. And so the Alliance would 
get also the possibility to strike preemptive blows on targets out of the area of their 
responsibility because in May, 2002 in Reykjavik NATO countries agreed that the 
Alliance must meet threats to their security from wherever they may come. For this 
apparently the Alliance has been creating on the US suggestion a rapid-reaction NATO 
Response Force of up to 21 thousand troops from three services Army, Air Force and 
Navy. 
The Leaders of European integration  – France and Germany  – already do not exclude 
now the possibility of creation in the nearest future on the EU basis a real confederation – 
a sort of the United States of Europe. Besides the EU has a definite basis for that in the 
form of Common legislative and executive authorities (Europarlament, Eurocouncil and 
Eurocommission). And s ince 1999 Customs and Currency unions were added by 
common currency-euro and the decision to form European quick reaction force, 
autonomous from NATO. All these events make such “dreams” a reality. 
The Americans as a whole refuse to take Europe as a collective member of NATO 
though the Europeans argue that they have parliament, common currency and will have 
their own Armed Forces and so on  – why not the only US partner united by common 
principles of administrations. But in future the Americans would have to take this into 
consideration. The United Europe with its own armed forces would turn some times into 
an independent center of force not dependent on the US dictate. And this in its turn will bring to the weakening of NATO and even to the Alliance’s disunity. Then the USA 
could loose control over Europe. 
Apparently Washington was guided exactly by this, when it demanded to conclude 
an official agreement between NATO and EU which would guarantee the North Atlantic 
Alliance priority over any independent operations of the European Union. 
But the EU leaders at that time resolutely rejected such demand and in resolution on 
the results of the Helsinki meeting put down that Eurounion would take independent 
decision about military operations and would conduct the without dependence on any 
NATO actions. And though the Europeans underlined that their close cooperation in 
defence matters would not only harm the European identity in NATO but strengthen the 
Alliance as a whole, this is the first portent to the independence. 
Taking into account that in due course the European Union will take in 
overwhelming majority of the European countries it is evident that NATO already in the 
nearest decade will be doomed to say good-bye to the role of “first violin” in decision of 
the  problems of the European security. And as some western experts note the only chance 
for NATO to prevent disunity is its transformation into consultative mechanism between 
the EU and USA. 
At the same time the EU would play more important and active role in  forming 
structure landscape of European Security. In difference from NATO “new EU” would 
have not only powerful military capability but would have at its disposal wide arsenal of 
economical, financial and political levels of state management. Taking into a ccount the 
fact that the majority of regional problems of Europe must not be effectively solved only 
with military means because they do not have long-term military solutions, the main 
active character in solving European security problems would be undoubtedly the EU. 
And by this the leadership of the EU would try to make out of the European Union a 
Center of economical and political force, which is naturally unthinkable without military-
political identity. At the same time Washington has understood that this process is not reversible and it is better to keep it under its control has agreed on the strategic 
partnership between NATO and the EU. 
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Apparently in this connection and with the change of international situation at the 
end of 2002 NATO and the E uropean Union have signed the Declaration of Strategic 
Partnership. As it was reported the EU would be given technical capabilities to conduct 
own military and peacekeeping operations but at the expense of NATO’s capability 
especially in military planning, logistics, mobility and intelligence. European command 
structures would also coordinate their actions with NATO command structures. 
Displacement of accents in NATO policy, moving to the front line problems of 
fighting with terrorism and new security threats in different regions of the world could 
bring to the beginning of contradictions and serious discords in the Alliance. The 
decisions of the Prague Summit of 2002 correspond first of all to the US interests, who 
would like to see NATO as an instrument for their position-of-force policy in solution of 
many political problems. But in its present state the Alliance could not play a role of 
efficient ally of Washington. This is affirmed in particular by the experience of military 
operations in Afganistan and  Iraq, conducted by the Americans really independently 
without NATO. But nevertheless the USA are interested in keeping up and support 
NATO because the Alliance to-day is a main instrument of American presence on the 
continent and not only military but also political and economical. 
Just another time the USA through the NATO headquarters in Brussels undertook an 
attempt to narrow the damaging transatlantic capabilities gap within the Alliance. The 
Symbol of this is the creation of the so-called NATO Response Force, consisting of land, 
sea and air elements, numbering up to 21 thousand troops who by 2006 must be ready to 
move quickly to wherever they might be required. In personnel and material matters new problems come up before the Europeans as 
together with  the formation of the EU rapid reaction force of 60000 troops in NATO 
there is the European Security and Defence Identity with the task as it was said earlier of 
achieving agreements, which permit to use necessary elements of NATO’s command 
structures to support WEU-led operations. A paradoxical situation is arising. NATO does 
not have permanent army and the majority of the so-called “NATO forces” is composed 
of national units who are remaining under national command and are turned over to 
subordination of N ATO military commanders in specific circumstances according with 
the procedures agreed by member-countries in advance. 
And so we have two powerful political organizations and this is a reality. But the 
other reality is that the majority of member-countries belong to both organizations. And 
reservoir from which troops are derived is one. But the aim declared by the European 
Union to deploy military forces of up to 60000 troops who could fulfill peacekeeping 
tasks will demand not less than 200 thousand troops because rotation would be necessary. 
But the European allies, having in the armed forces about 2 million troops could hardly 
allocate 40 thousand troops for the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. That is why 
European forces are still a “paper army”. For Great Britain as an example this means that 
units, who according to paper are ready to be transferred to the European forces have 
already been in action under NATO’s aegis for example in Kosovo or together with the 
Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion we would like to pay attention to the situation in NATO or around it 
and make some remarks in regards to further development of the European identity and 
its influence on the transatlantic links. 
1. The last events have shown that in its present state the Alliance could not play a 
role of effective ally of Washington. This was testified by the experience of the military operation in Afghanistan and war in Iraq, conducted by the Americans practically on its 
own without NATO support. And though the strategic role of Europe has diminished the 
USA nevertheless are interested in keeping and support NATO because at present the 
Alliance is a main instrument of the American presence on the continent and not only 
military but also political and economical. In this connection adapting to the time 
demands, NATO, using the ESDI’s experience regarding the CJTF, would reform its 
military structures into more flexible and effective joint (multi-service) task forces on a 
multinational basis by simultaneous reduction in a number of headquarters.  In this case 
NATO would become an organization capable to take quick decisions and if necessary to 
send combat formations to suppress terrorists’ sallies. 
2. Displacement of accents in NATO policy, moving forward problems of fighting 
terrorism and new security threats in different regions of the world could influence in our 
opinion the further development of the European Security and Defence Identity. The 
creation according to the decision of the Prague summit of NATO Response Force would 
be on a constant basis. This force should always be ready to conduct military actions 
throughout the world that is it should have its own command and headquarters and that is 
why it could not bee dependent on ESDI. 
3. The Alliance should develop good and effective links with the European Union. 
Saying that “more Europe in NATO does not mean less North America”, Lord Robertson 
underlined that transatlantic relations remain a key to the effectiveness of NATO and that 
without good transatlantic link could not be real stability in Europe or defence its 
democratic values. In that connection NATO is undertaking steps to intensify the 
participation of the European countries in ensuring security and strengthening by this 
cooperation between Europe and North America. NATO and other organizations such as 
EU and WEU should set close ties during joint sessions exercises and regular 
consultations, directed at the strengthening of cooperation. They are going to form such 
Armed Forces who are required to manage the more probable crisis situations and conflicts of the Future. It is working out the understandings on ensuring such a position 
under which one of these organizations that would head the activity on prevention the 
threat to peace in connection with such conflicts would have necessary powers, force and 
military equipment. 
4. As far as the economic capabilities of EU member-countries will be increasing, 
their political ambitions would not be only increasing but would be supported by 
economical power. In this case the strengthening of Euro as a possible alternative to 
dollar is of great significance. At the same time the growth of political ambitions, 
economical and financial powers of Europe would not be supported by the adequate 
strengthening of military might especially in modern weapons and military equipment. 
Moreover the dependence of Europeans on the USA in this sphere would be increasing. 
That is why it is unlikely in nearest future to look forward to the creation in Europe the 
Center of Force who could be a military-political alternative to the United States. 
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